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Expulsion of Own Nationals: What Implications for EU Citizenship? 
 
 
Sandra Mantu* 
Abstract 
This working paper examines the protection that EU citizens enjoy against expulsion from 
their host EU state in comparison to the protection that own nationals enjoy when it comes 
to expulsion. It is concerned with understanding how we legally frame the question of pro-
tection against expulsion in an area of common EU citizenship for persons who are not na-
tionals but enjoy a supranational citizenship status – EU citizenship - that distinguishes them 
from foreigners per se. If we take seriously the claim that EU citizenship is a fundamental 
status and a citizenship status, then the question of protection against expulsion for EU citi-
zens needs to be discussed alongside the protection enjoyed by nationals against expulsion 
from their state of nationality where they enjoy a right to be present on state territory. The 
questions explored by this contribution are whether it is possible to claim that EU citizenship 
creates a similar right of presence on state territory and whether we can speak of a notion 
of EU territory as a coherent space in which citizenship is to be enjoyed. 
1. Introduction 
This working paper examines the protection that EU citizens enjoy against expulsion 
from their host EU state in comparison to the protection that own nationals enjoy 
when it comes to expulsion. It is concerned with understanding how we legally frame 
the question of protection against expulsion in an area of common EU citizenship for 
persons who are not nationals but enjoy a supranational citizenship status – EU citi-
zenship - that distinguishes them from foreigners per se. If we take seriously the claim 
that EU citizenship is a fundamental status and a citizenship status, then the question 
of protection against expulsion for EU citizens needs to be discussed alongside the 
protection enjoyed by nationals against expulsion from their state of nationality 
where they enjoy a right to be present on state territory. In EU scholarship, the fact 
that EU citizens can be expelled from their host state is seen as indication that EU 
citizenship is better described as a migration status rather than citizenship status, per 
se. This position is linked with the general understanding that under international law 
states cannot expel their own nationals and that nationals enjoy a right to remain in 
the territory of their state of nationality (e.g., Article 13 Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, Article 12 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rightsand Protocol 
4 of the European Convention of Human Rrights). As an appendix of the principle of 
territorial sovereignty, states have the right to control the presence of foreigners on 
their territory, although this right is increasingly circumscribed by international hu-
man rights and refugee law.  From this perspective, the fact that EU citizens can be 
expelled from their host state is an indication that EU citizenship cannot be described 
                                                     
*  This working paper is based on research carried out in the context of the EXPULCIT project. EX-
PULCIT is funded by the European Commission through its Erasmus+ Programme (project identi-
fication 574912-EPP-1-2016-1-NL-EPPJMO-PROJECT). 
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as a nationality as the Member States can exercise a certain degree of control over 
the presence of EU citizens on their territory. This control is subject to the jurisdiction 
of the European Court of Justice and has to respect EU law, but it serves as a reminder 
that EU citizens are not nationals for the purposes of expulsion. Instead, EU citizen-
ship creates an alternative model that protects EU citizens depending on the duration 
of their residence in the host state and situates them at the crossroads of nationality 
and foreignness.  
By analyzing sources of protection against expulsion that go beyond EU law, the 
paper tries to understand what the EU rules on expulsion reveal about the nature of 
EU citizenship and the nature of protection that is awarded to EU citizens. The man-
ner in which we approach EU citizenship – as a citizenship status or something else, 
maybe an in-between status - has consequences for the legal framework that we use 
to assess the question of expulsion. By allowing expulsion, EU citizenship breaks away 
from one of the tenets of international law that views a national’s right to be present 
on state territory and to enter/leave that territory as a hallmark of nationality under-
stood as legal status that expresses the relationship between the state and the citi-
zen. The aim of this analysis is to understand what this position under international 
law implies for protection against expulsion and how such a principle functions in the 
EU context. This right to be present on the state’s territory with its corollary that the 
state can deny entry or expel non-nationals is changed by EU citizenship since EU 
citizens have a right to be present in the territory of other EU states but traditionally 
within their own state, the right to reside, to be present there stems from state na-
tionality as expression of the link between the citizen and the state territory. How-
ever, recent case law concerning static citizens whose family members face expulsion 
suggests that EU citizenship is creating a right to be present in the territory of the 
Union that creates a direct link between the EU citizen and the territory of the Union 
as the space within which EU citizenship is to be enjoyed. This link remains mediated 
by state nationality but it is possible to argue that it changes the relationship between 
the citizen, his/her state and the Union. The questions that the paper seeks to explore 
are whether it is possible to claim that EU citizenship creates a similar right of pres-
ence on territory and whether we can speak of a notion of EU territory as a coherent 
space in which citizenship is to be enjoyed similar to how national citizenship requires 
a state territory to which it is bounded. 
2. International Law and Expulsion of Own Nationals 
The starting point in international law is that the state enjoys a right to expel foreign-
ers but there are general limitations to this right that include substantive and proce-
dural standards such as the prohibition of abuse of rights, the principle of good faith 
or the prohibition of arbitrariness. It is primarily through international human rights 
law that standards have developed in this field, both substantive and procedural. In 
2014, the International Law Commission adopted draft articles on the expulsion of 
aliens as part of its mandate to codify rules of international law.1 ILC’s work engaged 
                                                     
1  UN (2014) ILC Draft articles on the expulsion of aliens with commentaries, A/69/10. 
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with the issue of expulsion of own nationals as a limit relating to the right of states to 
expel aliens. It equally clarifies that international law has been interested in own na-
tionals and expulsion only where the person was previously a state national but be-
came an alien – thus, it can be defined as an interest in deprivation of nationality and 
expulsion of former nationals. The ILC Draft Articles on expulsion focus on the treat-
ment of aliens and there is only one provision that addresses nationals as such. Draft 
Article 8 states that ‘A State shall not make its national an alien, by deprivation of 
nationality, for the sole purpose of expelling him or her.’ This provision deals with the 
very specific situation in which a state might deprive a national of his or her nation-
ality, and thus makes that national an alien, for the sole purpose of expelling him/her. 
Such a deprivation of nationality, insofar as it has no other justification than the 
state’s desire to expel the individual, would be abusive, indeed arbitrary within the 
meaning of Article 15(2) UDHR. Where it also creates statelessness, it would also vi-
olate the prohibition of creating statelessness stemming from the 1961 UN Conven-
tion on the Reduction of Statelessness.2   
The right to expel aliens is linked with the principle of territorial sovereignty: the 
existence of a state depends upon a population that recognizes its sovereignty and 
also a territory in which sovereignty is exercised de facto and de jure. ILC views ex-
pulsion as involving two fundamental interests: a) the fundamental principle of state 
sovereignty in the international order which gives the state the power to issue do-
mestic regulations in accordance with its territorial jurisdiction; and b) the fundamen-
tal principles underpinning the international legal order and basic human rights which 
all states must respect.3 As such the right to expel is viewed as a natural right of the 
state emanating from its own status as sovereign legal entity with full authority over 
its territory which may be restricted under international law only by the state’s vol-
untary commitments or specific erga omnes norms.4 That states have this right has 
not been contested in literature and is seen as reinforced by state practice and deci-
sions of human rights bodies including the ECtHR (see article 8 ECHR jurisprudence 
on expulsion of aliens stating that as a matter of well-established international law 
states have the right to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens5). The 
power to expel aliens needs to be exercised within the limits set by international law 
including considerations of humanity and is therefore limited to the rights of the in-
dividual and his/her property rights.6 Limits will need to be examined in light of a 
state’s obligations stemming from custom, treaty or general principles of law that are 
complemented by obligations they have under international human rights, refugee 
and migrant workers’ laws.7 Constitutional law may also contain rules specifically pre-
venting the expulsion of own nationals. According to the ILC there is no general rule 
                                                     
2  S. Mantu (2015) Contingent citizenship. The law and practice of citizenship deprivation in inter-
national, European and national perspectives, Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, p. 44-55. 
3  A/CN.4/581 para 4. 
4  A/CN.4/581 para 7. 
5  For example, Üner v. The Netherlands, Application no. 410/99, ECtHR 18 October 2006, para 54. 
6  A/CN.4/581 para 17. 
7  A/CN.4/581 para 19. 
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of international law that prohibits the expulsion of nationals in general. Yet, despite 
the lack of such a provision, a state may find it difficult to expel a national due to 
provisions of international human rights law. There seems to be doctrinal acceptance 
of the principle that states do not expel their own citizens but some authors cite ex-
pulsions of own nationals that have taken place in Latin American countries, showing 
that state practice may diverge from legal standards.8 While there is no jus cogens 
norm, there are international treaties that contain specific clauses that prevent the 
expulsion of own nationals and State parties to such Treaties have a conventional 
obligation not to expel. Examples include Article 3 of Protocol 4 of the ECHR, and 
Article 12(4) ICCPR, the latter is generally understood as an implicit prohibition stem-
ming from the right to return to one’s own country. These two examples are exam-
ined in more detail below. 
Article 12 ICCPR 
Article 12 ICCPR deals with the right to free movement, which comprises an internal 
element (freedom to move within a country) and an external one concerning move-
ment among states.9 The latter includes the right to leave one's country - Article 
12(2), and the right to enter one's ‘own country’ - Article 12(4). The right of a national 
to remain and return to his own country is seen as an essential right attached to na-
tionality under international law and a symbol of the difference between nationals 
and aliens. Moreover, the practical difficulties of expelling own nationals, which stem 
from the fact that expulsion is possible only if there is a receiving state willing to take 
the person in are seen as limiting the power of a state to expel own nationals. The 
position under international law is that states are under no obligation to receive back 
persons expelled who are not nationals10 – a state may agree to take back foreigners 
based on bilateral/multilateral agreements, as is the case with readmission agree-
ments in a migration context but the general rule remains that states are obliged to 
take back as a matter of international law only nationals. A different approach would 
lead to conflicts in the enjoyment of peaceful international relations. As a result, 
states are seen to enjoy discretion over the admission of aliens to their territory but 
not over nationals.  
                                                     
8  N. MacDermot, Latin America – Expulsions, the Right to Return, Passports, The Review: Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists, no 14, 1975, pp 3-8. 
9  Article 12 ICCPR states: 
 1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to 
liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 
 2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 
 3. The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are 
provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public 
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights 
recognized in the present Covenant. 
 4. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country. 
10  A. Kesby (2012) The Right to have Rights: Citizenship, Humanity and International Law, Oxford 
University Press. 
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In Stewart v Canada,11 the UN Human Rights Committee – the body tasked with 
supervising the implementation of the ICCPR - provided an interpretation of the no-
tion of ‘own country’ in relation to Article 12(4) ICCPR (no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of the right to enter his own country). The notion was found to include na-
tionals but also persons who although not nationals cannot be labelled aliens either 
within the meaning of Article 13 ICCPR. Based on the situations envisaged by the 
Committee, the persons who come within the personal scope of such a category of 
neither nationals nor aliens are mainly former nationals and persons who could not 
obtain the nationality of the state they reside in. Such aliens have special ties with 
the country or they have special claims in relation to a given country. The examples 
given by the Committee include persons stripped of nationality in violation of inter-
national law or persons whose country of nationality has been incorporated into or 
transferred to another national entity whose nationality is being denied to them. It 
may also include other categories of long-term residents, particularly stateless per-
sons deprived of the possibility to acquire the nationality of the country of residence 
but the notion does not go as far as to say that immigrants are as a rule included.12 
Thus, the notion of ‘own country’ although it may seem broad, in fact covers situa-
tions that are linked with the possibility of disturbing peaceful international relations 
by the fact that no other state would be willing to accept such persons on its territory, 
rather than an individual’s right to reside in his own country.13  
There is an increasing tension between the starting point of international law 
that is not amicable to the idea that a person can have more than one country to 
consider as his/her own and the fact that a migrant can potentially call two countries 
as his own: the state of nationality and the state of residence. While the position 
under international law stems from conflict of law rules and the attempt to mitigate 
the potential for disruption of peaceful international relations, a migrant’s right to 
reside in his host state is progressively being constructed under international migra-
tion and human rights laws. This tension is present also in the dissenting opinion of 
E. Evatt, C. Medina Qiroga and F. J. Aguilar Urbina in Steward v Canada. Their dissent-
ing opinion pushes towards a different interpretation of Article 12 ICCPR whereby an 
alien who is lawfully within the territory of a state may claim the protection of Article 
12, if s/he can establish that it is his/her own country. In their view  
 
‘for the rights set forth in Article 12 the existence of a formal link to the state is irrele-
vant; the Covenant is here concerned with the strong personal and emotional links an 
individual may have with the territory where he lives and with the social circumstances 
obtaining in it’ […] ‘the words his own country invite considerations of such matters as 
                                                     
11  Stewart v Canada, CCPR/C/58/D/538/1993, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), 1 November 
1996, available at: http://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,584a90807.html [accessed 16 October 
2018]. 
12  For a similar interpretation see also, UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment 
No. 27: Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), 2 November 1999, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, available 
at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139c394.html [accessed 29 October 2018]. 
13  A/CN.4/581, para 43. 
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long standing residence, close personal and family ties and intentions to remain as well 
as the absence of such ties elsewhere’.14  
 
The dissenters accept that where the person is not a national the connections would 
need to be strong to support a finding that it is his own country but that an alien 
should have the possibility to show this. The dissenting opinion in Stewart v Canada 
is an exemplification of the current trend whereby the protection given to nationals 
against expulsion is extended to aliens who have acquired a status similar to nationals 
under national law. The work of the Special Rapporteur Kamto on the ILC Draft Arti-
cles on the expulsion of aliens for example advocates that nationality is a restrictive 
and inadequate criterion against which to define the concept of alien.15 Kamto argues 
that the principle of non-expulsion of own nationals should be understood broadly as 
applying to ‘ressortissants’ of a state, that is not only to persons who like nationals 
have the nationality of a state but also to certain aliens who have a similar status to 
that of nationals under the laws of the receiving state or have ties with that state.16 
These are persons whom the state assimilates to nationals, they are not strictly 
speaking aliens either; in respect of such persons the state accepts limitations to its 
powers to expel.  
Article 3 Protocol 4 ECHR 
Article 3 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR17 contains a clear prohibition against the expulsion 
of own nationals: 
 
‘1. No one shall be expelled, by means either of an individual or of a collective measure, 
from the territory of the State of which he is a national.  
2. No one shall be deprived of the right to enter the territory of the State to which he is 
a national.’  
 
As it is the only provision reserved for the benefit of the nationals of ECHR state par-
ties, the underlying issue centres on the possession of the state party’s nationality 
and the power of the state party to either deny or deprive an individual of nationality, 
so as to make him an alien.18 According to the Explanatory Report to the drafting of 
Protocol 4, the drafters considered to introduce a provision stating that  
 
‘a State would be forbidden to deprive a national of his nationality for the purpose of 
expelling him’. Nevertheless, in the end ‘the majority of experts thought it was inadvis-
                                                     
14  Individual opinion by Elizabeth Evatt and Cecilia Medina Quiroga, co-signed by Francisco José 
Aguilar Urbina in Stewart v. Canada, para 5. 
15  A/CN.4/581 para 29. 
16  A/CN.4/581 para 43. 
17  Protocol 4 has been opened for signature on 6 May 1963 and entered into force on 2 May 1968. 
18  J.M. Henckaerts (1995) Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice, Martinus Nij-
hoff Publishers, p. 86-87. 
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able in Article 3 to touch on the delicate question of the legitimacy of measures depriv-
ing individuals of nationality. It was also noted that it would be very difficult to prove, 
when a State deprived a national of his nationality and expelled him immediately after-
wards, whether or not the deprivation of nationality had been ordered with the inten-
tion of expelling the person concerned.’19  
 
The Explanatory Report to Article 3 Protocol 4 states that the word ‘expulsion’ is to 
be understood in its generic meaning, in current use, that is ‘to drive away from a 
place’.20 The underlying idea is to prohibit any constitutional, legislative or adminis-
trative or judicial authority from expelling nationals from their own country.  The 
choice was made for the words ’state of which he is a national’ and not ‘own country’ 
because the former formulation was judged to have a more precise legal meaning. 
Besides historical examples of national laws allowing for exceptions from this rule, 
the Explanatory Report to Protocol 4 suggests that the drafters did envisage excep-
tions from the right of nationals to be present on state territory. The report argues 
that it was understood that an individual’s right to enter the territory of the state of 
which he was a national could not be interpreted as conferring on him an absolute 
right to remain in that territory as in the case of a criminal who is extradited to state 
B but returns to his state of nationality.  
Judging from the case law of the ECtHR, the scenario envisaged by the Protocol 
has come up rarely.21 On one occasion, the former Commission has dealt with a case 
in which the stateless claimant challenged the refusal of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many to award him nationality and afterwards tried to expel him.22 The Commission 
argued that prima facie it is not competent to rule on the refusal to grant nationality 
but it did not rule out the possibility of establishing a causal link between the denial 
of nationality and the immediate expulsion order and the fact that the sole aim of the 
denial of nationality was to make it easier for the authorities to expel the person. In 
this particular case, the Commission was not satisfied that such a link existed, holding 
that the state was within its rights to refuse nationality. Presumably, the standard of 
proof required for an opposite finding would be high. In an admissibility decision da-
ting from 2005, the Court argued, ‘in some cases the revocation of citizenship fol-
lowed by expulsion may raise potential problems under Article 3 of Protocol no 4’. In 
the end, it rejected the claim since the deportation order had not been carried out.23  
This short examination of the prohibition of expelling own nationals does not lead to 
a clear conclusion concerning the existence of a customary rule of international law. 
Article 12 ICCPR does not uphold an absolute right to be present on state territory; 
                                                     
19  Ibid., p. 77. 
20  Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, securing certain rights and freedoms other than those already included 
in the Convention and in the first Protocol thereto, CETS 046, available at https://rm.coe.int/ 
16800c92c0. 
21  D. Gomien, D. Harris & L. Zwaak (1996) Law and Practice Of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Social Charter, Council of Europe Publishing, p. 20. 
22  X v. Federal Republic of Germany, Application no. 3745/68, Dec. 15.12.69, Collection 31, p. 107 
(110). 
23  Naumov v. Albania, Application no. 10513/03, admissibility decision 4 January 2005. 
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rather we can speak of a derived right stemming from the prohibition of being ex-
pelled from one’s own country; and even in the context of ECHR (Protocol 4 ECHR) 
where we can speak of an express prohibition to expel own nationals, exceptions are 
envisaged. Opinio juris on this issue is also divided: some authors have suggested that 
this is a right held by individuals under international human rights law (Article 
13UDHR) rather than a consequence of the principle that states should not encroach 
upon other states’ sovereignty. However, such a position is complicated by the de-
claratory character of the UDHR and the absence of clear jus cogens rule. Other schol-
ars argue that ‘the right to admittance and prohibition of expulsion is only an implicit 
right based on the general right to return to one’s own country as expressed in the 
ICCPR’ and that the right is not absolute as what is prohibited is arbitrary deprivation 
of this right thus not deprivation in all cases.24 Derogations are allowed in cases of 
national emergency as long as they are not discriminatory in line with the general 
rules of Article 4 ICCPR. In his view ‘a state has an obligation to admit its nationals 
and not expel them when no other state is willing to permit the individual to remain 
within its territory as that would infringe on other states’ sovereignty’.25 As such, it is 
possible to speak of a right to admission, residence and/or against expulsion where 
such a right is provided by municipal/national law26, an issue that is differently ar-
ranged by the municipal laws, including in the EU context. This would suggest that 
the right not to be expelled that own nationals are supposed to enjoy against their 
state of nationality is the strongest where constitutional or municipal law upholds it 
rather than when simply provided for by international law.  
3. EU Citizenship and Expulsion 
EU law grants EU citizens a right to enter and reside in another EU state (Article 21 
TFEU and Directive 2004/38) and limits the possibility of the host EU state to end this 
right by providing for a limited number of grounds for expulsion – public policy, public 
security and public health – as well as offering material and procedural safeguards 
that EU states must observe as a matter of EU law. The EU rules concerning expulsion 
are protective of the EU citizen’s right to reside in his EU state of choice, and from 
the perspective of international law such an EU host state may be deemed an ‘own 
country’, with whom the EU citizen enjoys a special relationship. The family members 
of the EU citizen enjoy the same protection. The legal framework created by the EU 
citizenship provisions in the EU Treaties and secondary legislation comes close to the 
situation where, from the perspective of international law, municipal law provides 
for a positive right to enter and reside in one’s own country.  
 
                                                     
24  For an overview, see W.T. Worster (2009) International Law and the Expulsion of Individuals with 
more than one Nationality, 14 UCLA J. INT’L& Foreign Aff. 423, p. 431. 
25  Worster (2009) p. 433. 
26  Worster (2009) p. 440. 
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Nonetheless, important differences remain between the right to reside that nationals 
enjoy in their state of nationality based on that status and the right to reside enjoyed 
by EU citizens based on EU citizenship. As the Court states in its jurisprudence, ‘the 
right of Union citizens and their family members to reside in the European Union is 
not unconditional but may be subject to the limitations and conditions imposed by the 
treaty and by measures adopted to give it  effect’.27 Firstly, the notion of residence in 
EU citizenship law has been defined by the Court as legal residence that meets the 
conditions laid down in Directive 2004/38.28 These conditions differ depending on 
whether the EU citizen exercises a right of residence under Articles 6 or 7 of the Di-
rective; moreover for residence longer than 3 months different conditions need to be 
fulfilled depending on whether the EU citizen exercises free movement rights as an 
economically active or inactive person. Secondly, the right to reside can be limited on 
public policy, public security and public health grounds. The protection awarded via 
EU law to EU citizens and their family members is stronger than that awarded to al-
iens in general as the starting point in EU law is the citizen’s right to enter and reside 
rather than the state’s right to expel an alien. The strength of the protection enjoyed 
by EU citizens against expulsion from a host state is linked with the length of their 
residence and the level of integration in that host state. Concerning the length of 
residence, Article 28 of Directive 2004/38 provides for increased protection against 
expulsion after having acquired the right to permanent residence – that is, after 5 
years of continuous and legal residence in the host EU state. Permanent resident EU 
citizens and their family members can only be expelled on serious grounds of public 
policy and public security. Where the permanent resident EU citizen has resided for 
longer than 10 years in a host EU state, s/he can be expelled only on imperative 
grounds of public security – this level of protection is reserved for EU citizens only, 
TCN family members are excluded. Furthermore, the rules contained in Directive 
2004/38 rely on the notion of ‘integration’ to link residence and protection from ex-
pulsion: the longer the EU citizen has resided in a host state, the better integrated 
s/he is, so that the greater the safeguards are that citizen may rely on against expul-
sion.29 The Court has defined integration as based ‘not only on territorial and tem-
poral factors but also on qualitative elements, relating to the level of integration in 
the host member State’.30 The commission of crimes and execution of prison sen-
tences are example of situations that affect negatively the integration of the EU citi-
zen and have the potential to undermine the higher level of protection against expul-
sion that is reserved for permanent resident EU citizens.31 
At a more fundamental level, irrespective of the length of their residence in the 
host state and their integration level, EU citizens never enjoy the same treatment as 
nationals who in accordance with the ECJ’s interpretation of international law cannot 
be expelled from their state of nationality, nor denied a right to be present on that 
                                                     
27  Case C-193/16 E, EU:C:2017:542, para 16. 
28  Case C-424/10 and C-425/10 Ziolkowski and Szeja, EU:C:2011:866, para 46. 
29  See for example, Case C-145/09 Tsakouridis, EU:C:2010:708, para 25. 
30  Case C-378/12 Onuekwere, EU:C:2014:13, para 24. 
31  See for example, Case C-316/16 B and C-424/16 Vomero, EU:C:2018:256. 
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state territory. EU law upholds the traditional view that a national resident in his state 
of nationality enjoys a right to be there stemming from that nationality. As stated by 
Article 20 TFEU, EU citizenship does not replace state nationality – that is, it does not 
seek to replace the function of nationality as the expression of the link between the 
citizen and his/her state. For example, in the McCarthy case, the Court of Justice 
acknowledged the traditional position under international law that sees the prohibi-
tion of expelling own nationals as a marker of nationality 
 
‘Likewise, the Court has also held that a principle of international law, reaffirmed in Ar-
ticle 3 of Protocol No 4 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950, that European Union 
law cannot be assumed to disregard in the context of relations between Member States, 
precludes a Member State from refusing its own nationals the right to enter its territory 
and remain there for any reason (see Case 41/74 van Duyn [1974] ECR 1337, paragraph 
22, and Case C-257/99 Barkoci and Malik [2001] ECR I-6557, paragraph 81); that princi-
ple also precludes that Member State from expelling its own nationals from its territory 
or refusing their right to reside in that territory or making such right conditional (see 
Cases C-370/90 Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, paragraph 22 and C-291/05 Eind [2007] ECR 
I-10719, paragraph 31).’32   
 
Moreover, the Court uses this principle as the starting point in dealing with nationals 
of the Member States who have never moved and who claim protection against ex-
pulsion of their family members based on EU rather than national of human rights 
law. As a result,  
 
‘Mrs McCarthy enjoys, under a principle of international law, an unconditional right of 
residence in the United Kingdom since she is a national of the United Kingdom.’33  
 
For such EU citizens, the right to be present on state territory remains linked to their 
position as own nationals under international law. In the absence of an exercise of 
free movement rights, such an EU citizen remains as a general rule captured by na-
tional law and outside the scope of Directive 2004/38 and of Article 21 TFEU. The 
Court can be said to rely on the prohibition of expelling own nationals to delineate 
the scope of application of EU citizenship. Equally, by presenting such prohibition as 
an accepted principle of international law, it reinforces the strength of such a princi-
ple within EU states. 
Since EU citizenship is also additional to state nationality, it seems reasonable to 
expect that it enhances and supplements state nationality. The question remains to 
what extent EU citizenship also reshapes the relationship between citizen and own 
state and territory by introducing an additional right to be present on EU territory. 
There is one strand of case law in the court’s citizenship jurisprudence that can be 
seen to modify the right of residence in the state of own nationality. In this case law, 
EU citizenship itself functions as a source of protection of the right to be present on 
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the territory of the Union as a whole as the space within which EU citizenship rights 
are to be enjoyed. This case law concerns static EU citizens who are not themselves 
at risk of being expelled by their own state but whose family members are. While 
static EU citizens are not covered by Directive 2004/38 which details the rules con-
cerning the expulsion of mobile EU citizens and their family members, the Court of 
Justice has clarified that Article 20 TFEU prevents national measures which have the 
effect of depriving the Union citizen of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
the rights conferred upon them by virtue of their status as EU citizens.34 As EU citi-
zens, the nationals of the Member States may rely on the rights pertaining to that 
status including against the Member State of which they are a national.35 Although 
Article 20 TFEU does not give autonomous rights of residence to TCNs, in certain ex-
ceptional circumstances a right of residence must nevertheless be granted to a TCN 
who is a family member of an EU citizen if as a consequence of such a refusal, the EU 
citizen would be obliged in practice to leave the territory of the EU as a whole, deny-
ing him the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of 
the status of EU citizen.36  
The right of residence derived from Article 20 TFEU can be subjected to limita-
tions. Article 20 TFEU does not affect the possibility of the Member States to rely on 
an exception linked to upholding the requirements of public policy or public security. 
However, since the situation of the family member falls within the scope of EU law, 
the exceptions/limitation to Article 20 TFEU need to be assessed on the basis of EU 
law.  Relevant here are Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which en-
shrines the right to respect for private life and family life read together with the best 
interest of the child - Article 24(2) of the EU Charter. The concepts of public policy 
and public security need to be interpreted strictly and they cannot be determined 
unilaterally by the Member States. In practice, the Court applies a similar treatment 
to that stemming from Directive 2004/38 (no automatic connection between criminal 
conviction and refusal of residence permit; criminal record on its own is not enough 
to justify a refusal; the following factors are relevant in assessing the refusal: the per-
sonal conduct of the individual concerned;  the length and the legality of residence;  
the nature and gravity of the offence committed; the extent to which the person con-
cerned is currently a danger to society; the age of the children at issue and their state 
of health; the economic situation of the children; the children’s family situation).37 
The Court insists in this case law on the fact that the EU citizen would be forced 
to leave the territory of the Union as a whole if the family member is not allowed to 
stay, which can be interpreted as going further than simply creating a right to family 
reunification for the static EU citizen on the basis of EU law.38 In CS, the Court clarifies 
that the child  
                                                     
34  Case C-34/09 Zambrano, EU:C:2011:124. 
35  Case C-304/14 CS, EU:C:2016:674, para 24. 
36  Case C-164/14 Rendon Marin, EU:C:2016:675, para 74. 
37  Rendon Marin, para 84; also, Case C-304/14 CS, EU:C:2016:674.  
38  Case C-256/11 Dereci, EU:C:2011:734, para 66. 
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‘has the right, as a Union citizen, to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
European Union’.39  
 
and that the 
 
‘The expulsion of that child’s mother, who is his primary carer, could result in a re-
striction of the rights conferred by the status of Union citizen, as he may be compelled, 
de facto, to go with her, and therefore to leave the territory of the European Union as a 
whole. In this sense, the expulsion of the child’s mother would deprive the child of the 
genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights which the status of Union citizen nev-
ertheless confers upon him.’40 
 
The Court’s approach to expulsion in such cases comes close to the definition pro-
posed by the drafters of Article 3 Protocol 4 ECHR, who define expulsion as a measure 
that drives away the state national from that state territory. In this case, the situation 
where an EU citizen is forced to leave the territory of the EU is legally assimilated to 
the situation where a national would be faced with an expulsion measure from 
her/his state of own nationality. The relationship between the EU citizen and the ter-
ritory of the EU as the space within which this status and the rights attached to it are 
to be enjoyed becomes important suggesting the creation of a direct link between 
the citizen and the EU territory similar to the relationship that nationals enjoys with 
the state territory. Supranational citizenship status requires a physical space within 
which it can be enjoyed. It is not that state nationality is by-passed in this process and 
made irrelevant but rather that EU citizenship becomes more like a nationality status 
and the EU territory is no longer a composite territory of 27 national territories bun-
dled together in an area of freedom, security and justice; to a certain extent the no-
tion of EU territory gains materiality.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
This working paper has explored the links between the prohibition of expelling own 
nationals and the protection that EU citizens enjoy against expulsion on the basis of 
EU law. The fact that EU citizens can be expelled has been described as one of the 
limitations of supranational citizenship status and an indication that in certain aspects 
EU citizenship resembles a migration status. Relying on the prohibition of expelling 
own nationals as an organizing principle that would allow us to decide whether EU 
citizenship is a citizenship status or not may not hold too much promise once it be-
comes clear that under international law such prohibition is not absolute. When com-
paring EU citizens and own nationals, if we take the view (see Worster) that there is 
no positive right under international law that prohibits expulsion of own nationals – 
at best the prohibition concerns arbitrary expulsion – than the position of EU citizens 
is not that dissimilar to that of own nationals. Only where national law provides for 
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express prohibition of expulsion of own nationals and where state practice shows 
that no expulsion of own nationals takes place, are EU citizens less protected than 
own nationals. At the same time it is important to acknowledge that what from the 
perspective of international law what can be described as a non-absolute right not to 
be expelled from the state of own nationality, in the EU context becomes a much 
stronger right as a result of its incorporation into the EU citizenship legal framework. 
In its citizenship case law, the Court of Justice has taken the view that in the EU, own 
nationals enjoy an unconditional right to be present on state territory that is linked 
to their status as nationals and that nationals cannot be denied a right to enter their 
own state. This position is the entry point into defining the spheres of interaction 
between the protection against expulsion that nationals of the EU states can expect 
based on their respective statuses: own nationals and EU citizens. Where the EU cit-
izen has not moved s/he remains primarily an own national, and the protection that 
such a citizen and/or his/her family members can expect against state measures that 
restrict his/her right to reside on national territory is primarily national protection. 
Where the EU citizen has moved, protection stemming from EU citizenship status 
kicks in for both the EU citizen and his/her family members. Recent jurisprudence 
shows that in certain circumstances (where the EU citizen is at risk of being forced to 
leave the territory of the EU due to state measures affecting the residence rights of 
that citizen’s family members) EU citizenship makes important inroads into national 
protection by stepping in where that proteection stops. As a result, it is possible to 
speak of a direct link between the EU citizen and the territory of the Union as the 
space where EU citizenship rights can be enjoyed. The case law that sparks these ob-
servations continues to be described by the Court itself as limited to exceptional cir-
cumstances. However, the process of granting static EU citizens rights based on their 
EU citizenship status reshapes the relationship between own state, Union and EU cit-
izen by highlighting the territorial aspects of EU citizenship.  
 
 
